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Classical Theory of Competitive Market Price Formation 
Sabiou M. Inoua and Vernon L. Smith  
Chapman University    
     
Abstract. We offer an information theory of market price formation, formalizing and elaborating 
on an old, implicit, classical tradition of supply and demand based on buyers’ and sellers’ mone-
tary valuations of commodities (formally their reservation prices) and competition as a multilat-
eral higgling and bargaining process. The early laboratory market experiments, as it turns out 
with hindsight, established the remarkable stability, efficiency, and robustness of the old view of 
competitive price discovery, and not the neoclassical price theory (based on individual utility and 
profit maximization for given prices). Herein, we present a partial-equilibrium version of the the-
ory in which wealth is implicitly constant, and reservation values are fixed, as in the early exper-
iments, formulating an information interpretation à la Shannon that corresponds with modern 
notions of the pricing system as an information signaling system. Competitive equilibrium price, 
we show, conveys maximum information about the distribution of traders’ valuations. We illus-
trate the theory as it applies to a few market conditions (notably a non-clearing market case) and 





1 Introduction: Classical Market Price Formation and Experiments 
Neoclassical marginal analysis postulated consumers who choose quantities, conditional on given 
prices, to maximize utility defined over a continuous commodity space subject to a budget con-
straint in a premarket exercise, with producers choosing quantities, given prices, to minimize 
cost. The premarket requirement of given prices and the requirement that the “law of one price” 
hold in the market, precluded any possibility of articulating a price formation or discovery pro-
cess. Hence, Jevons (1871 [1888]) believed that buyers and sellers must have complete (or per-
fect) information on his model to reach equilibrium, a strong knowledge assumption that is the 
ancestor of more sophisticated modern versions (such as the common-knowledge axiom in game 
theory); Walras (1874 [1954]) pushed deeper than Jevons, by envisioning a market sufficiently 
well organized to provide a central procedure for announcing prices, thereby accommodating 
demand and supply theory based on optimal quantities at exogenously set prices to be bought 
or sold; centrally announced tentative prices are then adjusted in increments proportioned to 
excess supply (or demand) until a market clearing price is identified.1    
The early market experiments implemented neither Jevons’s requirement of complete infor-
mation, nor the Walrasian tatonnement procedure in a continuous commodity space; rather the 
experiments implemented a discrete commodity space using private buyers’ willingness to pay 
 
1 Walras’s mechanism is not among the many pricing institutions found in practice: “From 1919 until its abandon-
ment in 2015, due to recurrent charges of price manipulation, the London gold price was determined (“fixed”) using 
a procedure that implemented Walras’s tâtonnement—to our knowledge the only such market application, wherein 
it ultimately failed.” (Inoua & Smith, 2020c)  
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(WTP) or reservation values, and sellers’ minimum willingness to accept (WTA) reservation costs, 
with justifying references to Marshall (1890). (Chamberlin, 1948; V. L. Smith, 1962, 1964, 1965)   
Neoclassical theory was rooted in the postulate that prices were given (and corresponding opti-
mal demand and supply deduced) before they could have been found in markets, thus imposing 
pre-market price-taking action and the law of one price on the subsequent expression of market 
demand and supply. A proper theory would aim to derive such features, if correct, as results from 
more elementary assumptions. Moreover, the neoclassical utility framework adds nothing con-
sequential if commodities are discrete with consumers predominantly purchasing at most one 
unit of each item—shopping baskets almost all have at most one quart of milk, and/or one pound 
of butter, and so on. Consequently, individual marginal utility is total utility and exhaustively 
specified by WTP value.2  
As we argued elsewhere (Inoua & Smith, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c), the old, classical, view of market 
competition as a collective, multilateral, higgling and bargaining process, offers a helpful founda-
tion on which to build a modern theory of market price formation, despite any shortcomings of 
the original classical formulation (notably its insistence on long-run, natural value). Formally, clas-
sical competition involves buyer-buyer outbidding, seller-seller underselling, and buyer-seller 
haggling. Underlying this classical tradition, based on Adam Smith’s sketch in Wealth of Nations 
(1776 [1904], Book I, Ch. VII) and the clarifications and additions made by his French, English, and 
Italian followers, is an implicit conception of supply and demand based on traders’ monetary 
 
2 Markets solve deeper consumer inventory problems by finding small and large packages of divisible items that 
simplify and discretize quantity choice depending on consumer family size and shopping frequency. Hence, con-
sumer prices are formed directly out of the values most relevant to the immediate experience of consumers.     
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valuations of commodities: buyers and sellers come to market with revealable maximum WTP 
reservation values (as in auctions), and minimum WTA reservation costs. The collective market 
interaction of buyers trying to buy cheap, and sellers trying to sell dear, aggregates demand and 
supply as an integral part of the process of finding prices. Neither aggregation nor price discovery 
can be separated in classical market processes. Only at the close of the market can we properly 
identify quantities demanded and supplied as functions of price; and only at the close can we 
refer to the dispersed information in the crowd of buyers and sellers as having been aggregated 
into prices as external coordinating signals.  
The implicit general methodology underlying this old conception of markets (again, putting aside 
its limitations) is the just-mentioned realistic approach to economic motives based on observable 
variables (formally, the traders’ reservation “prices”), but also on the principle that the interest-
ing economic regularities are unintended properties emerging from market interactions (as con-
veys Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand” metaphor). As regards price theory, this paper’s sub-
ject, the fundamental market interaction leading to emergent regularities is of course competi-
tion itself; and the core emergent property of competitive price discovery is informational, as 
emphasized F. A. Hayek (1937, 1945, 1968 [2002]). That is, the competitive price system synthe-
sizes a sum of dispersed information about consumers’ needs and preferences and producers’ 
means of production and costs.  
This paper’s goal is to develop a mathematical theory of the old competitive price mechanism 
and derive from it an emergent informational characterization of the price mechanism. The 
5 
 
discussion comes full circle, in this regard, because a core concept needed to this effect was 
hinted at in the early experiments. We first motivate it. 
 
2 Motivation: The Competition and Information Principle 
Competitive price dynamics, as the analysis of early lab price dynamics data suggest (V. L. Smith, 
1962, 1965), can be characterized as a minimization of the famous area under the supply and 
demand curves, the integral function:  
  
0
( ) ( ) ( ) .
p
p
V p S x dx D x dx  (1) 
With hindsight, the centrality of this “hypothesis found to be most successful in these experi-
ments” has not been fully appreciated. (V. L. Smith, 1962, p. 112)  
As reinterpreted and generalized below, the minimum principle turns out to be a fundamental 
principle of price theory; it is a natural formulation of classical competitive dynamics, provided 
we treat supply and demand as aggregate value and cost distributions across individuals (rather 
than as individual outcomes of utility and profit maximization for given price), and provided we 
recognize that the famous area minimized yields the potential market surplus function available 
in a market (rather than the actual surplus extracted through trade, a dual concept introduced 
below). Then the minimization hypothesis means the potential gains from trade, the total surplus 
not yet realized (the money still on the table to speak in the vernacular) shrinks transaction after 
transaction as the traders compete to grab the most of it (and hence the traders’ total realized 
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gains, or actual surplus, increases transaction after transaction, in a dual manner).3 We first pause 
to motivate this hypothesis as a natural formulation of competitive dynamics, postponing the 
details of the proofs until the next sections.  
The simplest formulation of the minimum principle follows if we assume smooth supply and de-
mand curves (which we assume in this section to motivate the general treatment in the next 
section, postponing the rigorous smooth model treatment itself in Subsection 3.4). Then it is eas-
ily seen that the function (1) is an integral of excess supply: 
 ( ) ( ).
dV
S p D p
dp
 (2) 
Therefore, the integral function is minimized at a market-clearing price (which in the smooth case 
is unique as we shall see in Subsection 3.4) as long as the excess supply function is upward sloping 
(which is necessarily the case). Moreover, by the chain rule:  
                                                [ ( ) ( )] .
p pd ddV dV
S p D p
dt dp dt dt
 





It turns out that the dynamic inequality (3) is a specific (smooth) manifestation of a general law—
a competition principle—that applies more generally for discontinuous supply and demand 
curves (as is usually the case as we shall see shortly) and even when this discontinuity is such as 
to preclude existence of a market-clearing price: the minimum of the potential surplus function 
 
3 Originally, the hypothesis, called the “excess-rent hypothesis”, was formulated as a best empirical descriptor of 
competitive equilibrium convergence. (V. L. Smith, 1962) Here we are offering a more natural, more general, formu-
lation of the hypothesis.  
7 
 
is the general competitive equilibrium concept, and there is always at least one such minima for 
any supply and demand configuration.  
By definition of supply and demand as cumulative distribution functions of consumers’ (utility) 
valuations (or use-values, or values for short) and producers’ cost valuations (or costs), the 
smooth treatment of supply and demand curves is reasonable only as an approximation of a large 
market (see Subsection 3.2). More generally, the following formula for the potential surplus func-
tion is not hard to derive (see Lemma 1 in Subsection 3.2 below):   
 ( ) ,
v p c p
V p v p c p  (4) 
in which the notation means summation across all values v p  and all costs ,c p  due to the 
profitability condition of trade. (A proper normalization is needed for a large-market case: one 
simply thinks in average terms.) For the usual case of discrete values and costs { :iv 1,..., }i n  
and { :jc j 1,..., },m  which we refer to generically as reservation “prices” { :ur 1,..., },u m n
then (4) reads  
 
1
( ) ( ),
m n
u uu
V p r p a p  (5) 
where we indicate whether a unit u  is affordable (or profitable) at a standing price ,p namely:  
 1( ) ( ), ,..., ,i ia p I v p i n  (6) 
  1( ) ( ), ,..., .j ja p I c p j m  (7) 




  if  is true,
( )







In the form (5), the potential surplus (trader profit) function measures the overall distance be-
tween the standing price and the distribution of values and costs. To emphasize this interpreta-
tion, we shall refer to it at times as the price-value distance function (where value here means 
more generally all the traders’ valuations, including the sellers’ cost valuations). By definition, 
any point that minimizes the price-value distance function is a best summary of the value and 
cost distribution: namely a generalized median of the distribution of traders’ valuations. (Without 
the profitability condition, we would have a simple median of the values and costs.) We shall call 
the set of these generalized medians, the value center. 
The basic affordability or profitability function (6)-(7) plays an intrinsic role in the formulation of 
competition. If a competitive price move 1t tp p  involves outbidding (underselling) among 
the pairs ( , )u l  until one of the buyers (sellers) can no longer afford the standing price, then by 
definition 1 1 0( ) ( ) ,u t l ta p a p  meaning either 1 0( )u ta p  or 1( )l ta p 0, depending on 
which unit holder is excluded from the price race. More generally, if a price move 1t tp p is 
driven by multilateral buyer-buyer or seller-seller competition involving k  units 1{ ,..., },ku u  and 
at least one of the unit holders is excluded from the race (meaning pushed beyond the limit price 
they can stand), then we have by definition: 
 
1 21 1 1
0( ) ( ) ( ) .
ku t u t u t
a p a p a p  (8) 
As to buyer-seller haggling involving a pair ( , )u l and causing a price move 1,t tp p the rivalry 
consists, not in excluding the other party from trading, but, to the contrary, in a party conceding 
a more favorable price to the counterparty by forgoing some surplus; that is, buyer-seller hag-
gling leads to the seller cutting the price or the buyer offering a higher price, hence a reduction 
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of the initial potential surplus ( tp )jc or( )i tv p  to the lower 1( tp )jc or( iv 1).tp More 
generally, a buyer-seller haggling involves a concession of potential surplus of the form: 
 1 .u t u tr p r p  (9) 
The two implications (8) and (9) of competition are summarized in ,kV  which reflects all possible 
competitive interactions, where k  is the maximum number of units that compete simultaneously 























By the principle of competition, we mean throughout the assumption that the market considered 
is predominantly driven by competition in the sense that for every price move tp 1tp there 
is an integer 2tk  such that 1( )t
k
tV p ( ).t
k
tV p But since 1( )t
k
tV p ( )t
k
tV p is equivalent to 
1( )tV p ( ),tV p we adopt this latter, simpler but equivalent, formulation, and we will not re-
peat the rather complex multinomial formula (10), although it is implicitly assumed throughout.  
The competition principle thus formulated leads naturally to an interpretation of price discovery 
as an information aggregation process, a core function of the price mechanism according to the 
famous intuition by Hayek (1937, 1945), which stimulated theoretical contributions, within a ne-
oclassical framework, of a general informational characterization of price formation, notably the 
Hurwicz program (Hurwicz, 1960; Hurwicz, Radner, & Reiter, 1975), whose conceptual apparatus 
was adopted in experimental economics (V. L. Smith, 1982). In this paper we suggest a classical 
 
4 We have used the identity 1( ) , ,ku ua a k shared by all indicator functions.  
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informational characterization of competitive price discovery, which we refer to as the principle 
of maximum information (PMI). An aspect of this informational characterization of competition 
was already hinted at earlier, when we formulated the competition principle as a minimization 
of the price-value distance function (5): thus, competitive price evolves towards a best, robust, 
summary (a generalized median) of the traders’ valuations.5  
The PMI is more naturally formulated in the language of information theory (Shannon, 1948). 
(We motivate a general formulation here, adopting a price concept common to all trading insti-
tutions—transaction price—and specializing the principle for the particularly informationally rich 
double-auction market institution in Subsection 4.6.) Think of a market as an information pro-
cessing machine wherein the trade messages reveal hidden information about the underlying 
supply and demand (the private traders’ valuations), thereby conveying such information into 
public prices (Figure 1).  
 
               
Figure 1. The Market as an Information Aggregation Machinery. 
A transaction concluded at a price p  reveals existence of a cost c p  and a value ,v p  which 
are private information. In probabilistic terms, the trade is formally the realization of the event 
 
5 This interpretation of the price mechanism links value theory to the robust statistics literature and suggests a fun-
damental reason in favor of median-based statistics (based on least-absolute errors) in economics compared to the 
more popular mean-based approach (based on least-square errors). More on this in Footnote 20. 
Equilibrium price p* 
 Information  
Aggregation  
Trade message or  
event {p accepted} 
 
implies events {v ≥p} 







{  accepted},p implying realization of the two events { }v p  and { }.c p  Thus every trade that 
takes place in a market provides uncertainty-reducing knowledge of net economic worth. Value,
,v measures resource value added to society; cost cmeasures resource value foregone by soci-
ety. Hence, acceptance implies a contract price such that ,v p c signaling net gain for society. 
According to Shannon’s theory, the amount of information the realization of an event reveals is 
measured (up to a multiplicative constant that fixes the unit of information) by the log-probability 
of the event (and this important formula follows from the simple axiom of additivity of infor-
mation revealed by the joint realization of independent events). In standard information theory, 
the total information (or entropy) is obtained by integrating (averaging) over a (whole) probabil-
ity distribution of possible realizations. For our purpose, however, the total information a trade 
reveals about the distribution of values and costs is obtained by integrating across the relevant 
range of the cost and value distributions revealed by the trade event.  
Let prob( )c p  be the probability that a unit, randomly drawn from the total m n units, is a 
supply unit with cost ;c p  and similarly let prob( )v p  be the probability that a unit is a de-
mand unit with value .v p  Then the information content of a trade event occurring at a price 




( ) log prob( ) log prob( ) ,
p v
c p
I p c x dx v x dx  (11) 
 
6 The choice of cumulative probability in information measurement, natural for our purpose, has also been defended 
as more general than the standard one based on simple probability (Rao, Chen, Vemuri, & Wang, 2004). Dynamic 
refinements of Shannon entropy also have been suggested that are based on the less general probability density 
concept but that involve similar integration ranges than the ones we adopted (Di Crescenzo & Longobardi, 2002; 
Ebrahimi, 1996).  
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where min min{ }jc c  and max max{ }.iv v
7 By definition of supply and demand as distribution 











( ) ( )
( ) log log .
p v
c p
S x D x
I p dx dx
m n m n
 (13) 
The competition principle is equivalent to maximization of this information function. This follows 






dt S p dt
 (14) 
Having briefly motivated the competition principle and its welfare and informational interpreta-
tion, we now derive the theory more formally (starting from scratch to avoid any ambiguity). 
Although we derive the PMI (and its various aspects) from the competition principle as a matter 
of exposition, the informational principle is more general and more fundamental, as we will em-
phasize throughout this paper (notably in the Applications, Section 4, and in the Conclusion).  
 
 
7 By an abuse of notation, I stands for both the indicator function and the information function being introduced: 
the risk of confusion is minor, however. 
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3 Theory  
3.1 Setup: Notations, Definitions, Identities 
Consider the market for a good or service involving the reservation values and costs of all indi-
vidual actors combined:8 
                                                     1 1[ ,..., ; ,..., ],n mv v c cr  
which we write generically as r [ ].ur An example, is the first reported market experiment, Table 
1:  
Costs 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 
  Values 3.25 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 
Table 1. Example of value and cost distributions (V. Smith, 1962, Chart 1). 
The values and costs are represented by their cumulative distribution functions (interpreted as 
market demand and supply functions) defined by: 
    
1
( ) #{ : } ( ).
n
i ii
D v i v v I v v  (15) 
     
1
( ) #{ : } ( ).
m
j jj
S c j c c I c c  (16) 
 




Figure 2. Cumulative Value and Cost Distributions in Table 1. 
For any arbitrary (nonnegative) real number x (say a transaction price), the gap between the 
value and cost distributions (or market excess demand function) is defined as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).Z x D x S x  (17) 
Let the quantity allocation vector be given by the trade indicators, referenced collectively as  
 1 1[ ,..., ; ,..., ],n n m nq q q qq   
where 1iq  if unit i  is bought and 0iq  otherwise; 1jq  if unit j  is sold and 0jq  oth-
erwise. To each unit is associated a transaction price, where nontraded units can be assigned 
arbitrary prices (say the final transaction price): let these transaction prices be referred to as   
                                                   1 1[ ,..., ; ,..., ].n n m np p p pp  
Total sales and total purchases are identical, both in terms of number of units traded and in terms 
















p q  (19) 
The total surplus generated through trade is by definition the sum of buyers’ and sellers’ profits, 
( ) ,u u uu r p q which, owing to identity (20), reducing to ,u uur q hence is independent of the 
price distribution per se [which, for example, we could have simplified into a uniform transaction 
price vector [ ,..., ]p p  and still get the same exact total surplus, invoking identity (18)]. Thus, de-
fine the surplus function, which gives the total gain from trade as a function of the allocation 







r qq r q  (21) 
Since by construction 0mean( ) ,q  we have cov( , )r q   /( ),n mr q  hence surplus func-
tion is the covariance between the allocation vector and the traders’ valuations: 
 ( ) ( )cov( , ).m nq r q  (22) 
Let the distance function between price and value be9 
 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ).
n m
i i j j
i j
V p v p I v p c p I c p  (23) 
Define the center of value to be the set of points that minimize the price-value distance function: 
 arg min ( ).xC V x  (24) 
 




Assuming no unit is traded at a loss, the transaction price domain (in which the commodity’s 
transaction price is bound to lie) is necessarily,  
 [min( ),max( )],j ic v  (25) 
which we assume nonempty, to avoid trivial no-trade markets.10 Thus, we assume 1,n 1,m  
and min( ) max( ).j ic v  We also write simply min[ ,c max ].v   
Let the information that a transaction price conveys about the value and cost distributions be 





( ) ( )




D x D x
I p dx dx
m n S x
 (26) 
This function is well-defined since 0,D S  on the transaction price set min[ ,c max ].v  
Let the price dynamics be formulated in terms of the standing transaction price, and written re-
cursively as 
 1 ( ),t tp H p  (27) 
 
10 We note, however, that this condition suppresses non-trade information that is of potential value in fostering 
innovation or responding to other changes in the data of an economy. For example, suppose we have a no-trade 
good with ask price = min (c)> max (v) = bid price. But if min(c) is little above max (v) this condition may induce a cost 
lowering innovation allowing trade, or an importer may see an opportunity to better the no trade domestic ask price. 
Hayek perceptively noted that “economic theory…starts from the assumption of a ‘given’ supply of scarce goods. 
But…which things are goods and how scarce—these are precisely the things which competition has to discover.” 
(Hayek, 1984, p. 256) Hence, non-trade prices may be informative signals that induce adaptive change.       
11 Following standard custom in information theory, we take the base-2 logarithm, hence measure information in 
bits in the simulations below. Of course, this is merely a convention. 
17 
 
where H  is a continuous function. One can define tp to be the price of the tht transaction, thus 
interpreting t as a transaction number, incrementing by a unit whenever a transaction occurs. It 
is convenient to write the price trajectory more explicitly as 0 0{ ( ) : }.
tH p t  12  
Empirically, price dynamics is not always solely driven by market competition, but it may be con-
strained by the specific trading institutions (Section 4) and even be controlled by a regulation.13 
We shall distinguish a price dynamics purely driven by traders’ competition from a constrained 
price dynamics: the theoretical reference is of course the unconstrained case, which we defined 
precisely as a case where there is no artificial bound on the dynamics of the potential surplus 
function, which can therefore reach its lowest possible minimum. We call any deviation from this 
purely competitive equilibrium state, a friction.  
In summary, we adopt the following definitions and assumptions: 
Definition 1 (Market). Let a market be abstractly identified with the data [ ],Hr, namely the dis-
tribution of values and costs r 1[ ,..., ;nv v 1,..., ]mc c  and the price motion 0 0{ ( ) : }.
tH p t  
Definition 2 (Competitive market). Let [ ]Hr,  be a market. We say that a price move tp 1tp
( )tH p  is competitive (driven by traders’ competition) if 1( ) ( ).t tV p V p  The market is 
 
12 The superscript notation stands for composition of the functionH with itself (rather than an exponent): that is, 
0( )H x x and ( )tH x 1( ( ))tH H x denote iterations of .H   
13 A regulatory constraint on price can be written generically as 0( ) ,g p where in practice g is usually an affine 
function for State intervention: thus a price control setting a floor minp p corresponds to ( )g p min ,p p
whereas a price ceiling constraint maxp p imposed on price corresponds to
13  
13 A regulatory ( )g p max .p p  
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competitive if its whole price trajectory 0 0{ ( ) : }
tH p t  is a succession of competitive price 
moves. We say that the market reaches competitive equilibrium (C.E.) if it attains stationary po-
tential surplus. 
Definition 3 (Pure competition). Consider a market [ ].Hr, We say that its price dynamics is purely 
competitive (or that competition is unconstrained or frictionless) if the minimum potential surplus 
is attainable under the trading rules inducing :H  that is, if for any arbitrary 0 ,x  
 0
0
min{ ( ( ))} min ( ).t
xt
V H x V x  (28) 
We assume the commodity is bought for final use and thus exclude re-trading (and speculation 
by the same token) and assume given [ ].Hr,  Besides this general assumption fixing the frame-
work, the price theory under development rests on one core principle:  
Assumption (Competition Principle). The market is competitive (in the sense of Definition 2). 
In mathematical jargon, the competition principle amounts to saying that the potential surplus 
function is a Lyapunov function. The main mathematical ingredient is the so-called invariance 
principle, an extension of Lyapunov’s classic stability theorem due to Barbashin, Krasovskii, and 
LaSalle.14 The core idea behind the invariance principle (or invariant set theorem) is a generaliza-
tion to sets of the concept of equilibrium and stable points, with convergence to a point attractor 
becoming convergence to a set attractor; intuitively, a dynamical system converges to a set if it 
ends up being within (or on the boundary) of the set: thus, the system may be endlessly moving, 
but within the set. A set is invariant with respect to a dynamical system if the system, once it 
 
14 Lyapunov (1892, 1892 [1992]), Krasovskii (1959 [1963]), LaSalle (1960), Barbashin and Krasovskii (1961). 
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reaches that set, will always stays in it: in other words, an invariant set is a generalization of the 
concept of equilibrium point. A dynamical system that possesses a Lyapunov function will con-
verge to an invariant set on which the Lyapunov function attains a stationary value. That is the 
essence of the invariance principle. (See Appendix for the formal statement.)  
3.2 Implications of the Theory 
First, we emphasize the following implication of the competition principle that has an interest in 
itself (rather than as a new ingredient for the sequel). In discrete time, the law of supply and 
demand is usually ambiguously formulated by saying that price change and excess demand have 
the same sign. Which excess demand? At which price? The initial one? The final one? The stand-
ard assumption is the initial excess demand, as suggested by the direction of causation: 
1( ) ( )t t tp p Z p 0;  but particularly for a long enough time interval, it is clear that intermediary 
supply-demand imbalances along the way cannot be summarized by the initial one.  
Proposition 1 (Law of Supply and Demand). From the competition principle 1( )tV p ( )tV p de-
rives a natural formulation of the law of supply and demand in discrete time: the sign of a price 
change tp 1tp is the same as the sign of the average excess demand across the price path.  
Proof. SinceV is an integral of excess supply (Lemma 1 below), the competition principle reads 
 
1





D x S x dx  (29) 
This is a natural formulation of the law of supply and demand as follows. Define the average 









( ),                               ,
( , )







Z p p p
z p p
Z x dx p p
p p
 (30) 
Thus, the competition principle is equivalent to the statement 1 1 0( ) ( , ) .t t t tp p z p p ∎ 
Proposition 2 (Competitive Dynamics). A competitive price converges to a set of minimum price-
value distance (or potential surplus) across the trajectory followed: that is, tp { :x ( ) },V x
as ,t where 0min{ ( ( )) :V H p 0}.   
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the invariance principle (Mathematical Appendix).15The 
main idea is intuitively clear: sinceV is non-increasing, the sequence 0 0{ ( ( )) : }
tV H p t  is a se-
quence of nonincreasing numbers that converges to a limit .∎ 
Remark 1. The competitive attractor { : ( ) }x V x in general may depend on the whole price 
trajectory 0{ ( )}.
tH p To say anything more about price dynamics requires more details about ,H  
which in practice means the specifics of the market institution under study (the rules organizing 
trade in the market) and other exogenous constraining factors. Theorem 1 below, the central 




15 In fact, the invariance principle allows for a finer specification of the competitive attractor: notably, only the in-
variant subsets of 1( )V  are relevant. For our purpose, however, Proposition 2 suffices. 
16 Theorem 1 might be extended, we believe, to a more general case of constrained competition, with appropriate 
proviso such as a so-called “constraint qualification”, as developed in the theory of convex optimization. 
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Theorem 1 (Purely Competitive Dynamics). A purely competitive market, from any initial condi-
tion, converges to the value center, which is an optimal robust summary of the distribution of 
traders’ valuations, and reflects its maximum information: tp C arg min ( )x V x
arg max ( ).x I x This global attractor of competitive price corresponds to maximum surplus. 
Quantity traded also reveals maximum information about the reservation prices in that the com-
petitive allocation *,q  which maximizes surplus, is an allocation with maximum covariance with 




Figure 3. Simulation of a Lab Market Dynamics (V. L. Smith, 1962, Chart 1). (a) Supply 
and Demand (Table 1 and Figure 2). (b) Price dynamics. (c) Potential surplus function 
V (left scale) and information function I (in bits, right scale). (d) Dynamics of V.  
Proof. The convergence tp C is a consequence of Proposition 2 and the definition of pure com-
petition (Definition 3), or 1( ) .V C The rest of the proof follows from Lemmas 1-3 below: that 
argmax ( )C I x is proven in Lemmas 3; that minV max follows from the important price-
quantity duality in Lemma 3.∎ 
Lemma 1 (Properties of the Potential Surplus Function). The price-value distance function is an 
integral of excess supply and a convex Lyapunov function for a competitive market. Besides con-





( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
n m
i i j ji j
V p v p a p p c a p  (31) 
 
0
0( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] .
p
V p V S x D x dx  (32) 
 ( ) , .V p p  (33) 
 1( ) ( ).t tV p V p  (34) 
 0.V  (35) 
Proof. We stated (31), (34), and (35), true by construction or assumption, merely for complete-
ness. The following formulas follow from graphical inspection of the relevant areas (Figure 4): 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ),
p
j j ja x dx p c a p   
 ( ) ( ) ( ).i i i
p
a x dx v p a p   
 
Figure 4. The basic profitability/affordability indicator function. Left: 
( ) ( ).a x I c x Right: ( ) ( ).a x I v x   
Thus, by summation, we get as claimed in Section 2 (Motivation): 
          
1 1 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
pn m
i i j ji j p
V p v p a p p c a p D x dx S x dx  
Formula (32) then follows by additivity of integration across intervals: 
 
1 0 0
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
pn
ii p
V v D x dx D x dx D x dx  (36) 
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Z |L x |y since| |Z L for some L
0; hence ( )V x ( )V y as ,x y proving continuity of .V Convexity of | jc | ( )jx I c x and 
| | ( )i iv x I v x (obvious graphically and easy to prove) is preserved by summation, henceV
is convex.17 Property (33):18 0lim | | ( ) ,j j
x
c x I c x lim| | ( ) ,j j
x
c x I c x lim
x
| iv
0| ( ) ,ix I v x and lim | | ( )i i
x
v p I v p 0, hence, by summation, lim ( )
x
V x .∎  
 
Remark 2. The competitive attractor C  is graphically identified as the conjunction of the supply 
and demand curves when these latter are treated as if continuous (solid) curves (hence ignoring 
the discontinuities). More rigorously, the following properties characterize it.  
Lemma 2 (Properties of the Value Center). (a) The value center argmin ( )C V x is nonempty 
for any market [ , ]Hr . (b) It generalizes the market-clearing equilibrium concept: C [ , ],r r  
where r sup{ :x 0( ) }Z x  and r inf{ :x 0( ) };Z x if 0( *)Z p  then * .p C  (c) It is in 
the trade price range:C min max[ , ].c v It coincides with the information-maximizing price 
set: C arg max ( ).x I x    




Z  sinceZ is a nonincreasing step func-
tion, two cases are possible, as depicted in Figure 5; thus by definition of ,r the area is maximum 
for p in[ , ].r r  That C generalizes the clearing set 1 0( ),Z  which may be empty, is also clear 
 
17 To save space, we adopt a simplified integral notation in the proof, omitting dx, for example. 
18 In mathematical jargon, this property is sometimes referred to as “radial unboundedness”. 
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graphically. More formal proof: Take 0. By definition of ,r 0Z  on [ - , ]r r  andZ 0
on [ , + ],r r thus ( - ) - ( )V r V r 0
r
r
Z and ( + )V r ( )V r
+r
r Z  hence r is 
a local minimum, and so is also any point in [ , ];r r and similarly r is also a local minimum. By 
convexity of ,V local minima of this latter are also global minima, hence C [ ,r ].r If 0,
0( *) ,Z p then *p r by definition of ,r and *p r by definition of ,r hence * .p C 19(c) 
For x min ,c ( )S x 0 and ( )Z x min( )Z c 0min max( ) ( ) ,D c D v hence .x r Similarly if
x maxv then
_ .x r ThusC min max[ , ].c v (d) Define log( / )D S on min[ ,c max ].v Clearly
Z 1[exp( ) ]S  and sign( )Z sign( ), { :x ( )Z x 0} { :x ( )x 0},  and { :x ( )Z x 0}









[ , ].r r ∎ 
 
19 On can go further in the analysis ofC as generalizing the clearing set 1 0( )Z through the concept of generalized 




Figure 5. The center of value is graphically the set of prices that maximize the area 
below excess demand Z. It generalizes the concept of market-clearing price: formally 
C = [r+, r-], where the endpoints are, the critical points at which Z changes sign. 
The following core lemma characterizes the market mechanism as a linear program.20 
Lemma 3 (Fundamental Price-Quantity Duality). A purely competitive market mechanism can be 
characterized as a linear program where primal and dual are equivalent to:  
primal
dual
min{ ( )}                                                                ( )




If the price-quantity pair ( *, *)p q  solves the two programs, then ( *) ( *).V p q             
Proof. Givenr 1[ ,..., ;nv v 1,..., ]mc c 1[ ,..., ;nr r 1,..., ],n mr r we can write  
                      
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ).
n m
u u u uu u n
V p r p I r p r p I r p  
 
20 A similar linear-programming formulation is common in the robust statistics literature (Abdelmalek, 1974; 




Following standard procedure in linear programming, we decompose the relevant variables into 
positive and negative parts, corresponding to price p 1p 2p (we must not impose 2 0p be-
forehand) and the potential unit surpluses 1us 0max{ , },ur p 2us max{p 0, },ur so that by 






s Let k1 1 1[ ,..., ] and k0
0[ , 0..., ]  be the1 k  vectors of 1 and 0, and let kI be the k k identity matrix. Let the vectors
1s 11 1[ ,..., ],m ns s 2s 21[ ,s 2..., ],m ns s 1[p 2 ,p 1s 2
T] ,s e 0 0[     n m1 0  ],m n1 0  and the 
(m )n 2[ (m )n 2]matrix J T[ m n1
T  m n1 m nI ],m nI so that ( )V p es  and the 
constraintr Tm np1 1s 2s is equivalent to 
T.Js r  Thus the optimization min{ ( ) :V p p
} is equivalent to the linear program: 
 Tmin{ : , }.es Js r s 0  (37) 
The dual program is: 
    T Tmax{ : , }.m nrq J q e q  (38) 
The  constraint in the dual program is equivalent (if written explicitly) to the requirements: 
0 0, ,m n m n1 q 1 q
T[  ] ,n mq 1 0
T[  ] ,m nq 1 0 which means: 









[ , ], ,..., ,
[ , ], ,..., .u
u n
q
u n m n
 (40) 
Assume the pair ( *, *)s q solves the two programs. Then the so-called complementary slackness 





























Hence, the dual program is surplus maximization. We know that the first program has an optimal 
solution and we even characterized the optimal set (the value center ).C It follows from the 
strong duality theorem of linear programming theory that ( *)V p *es *rq ( *).q ∎  
The maximum surplus is of course the famous area below the supply and demand curves (Figure 
6), given by the formula: 
 
0
( *) min{ ( ), ( )} .S x D x dxq  (43) 
  
Figure 6. Maximum Attainable Surplus is the Hatched Area. 
Proof. We know that [ , ]C r r  from Lemma 2. For any *p in ,C and by definition of ,r
D S  in 0[ , *]p  and D S in[ *, ].p Hence
0














D ( *) ( ).V p q* ∎                  
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In experimental contexts, the maximum surplus is the maximum money that the subjects could 
take collectively from the experimenter. It has thus become customary in experimental econom-
ics to measure the efficiency of a market by the fraction (or percentage) of the maximum attain-
able surplus that the subject-traders extract (Plott & Smith, 1978).21 The efficiency the market 











The overwhelming experimental finding is 100Efficiency( ) %tq (or nearly so) for non-re-
tradable goods.   
3.3 Competition: Dual Formulation 
Competition among traders has an implication in terms of price dynamics, on which we focused 
mostly so far, but also in quantity allocation emphasized in the duality result (Lemma 3). In fact, 
we could have chosen to take as axiom, the dual formulation of the competition principle. More-
over, the study of trading institutions is perhaps more explicitly done in the dual formulation of 
price theory, which this section briefly presents. A trading institution, described formally in V. L. 
Smith (1982, p. 925), specifies, among other things, the types of messages (price or quantity 
quotes: bids, asks, acceptance, notably) traders are allowed to send, and an allocation rule, which 
states the allocation of commodity units each trader receives given the standing message vector 
sent by all traders.  
Formally, let the allocation dynamics be written recursively as 
 
21 Efficiency in experimental markets was defined by Plott and Smith (1978). “These markets are perfectly efficient 
if and only if the maximum amount of money is extracted by the participants from the experimenter.” (1978, p. 139)   
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 1 ( ).t tRq q  (45) 
We can rephrase competitive value theory in terms of the allocation rule ,R stating the dual ver-
sion of each implication point in the discussion centered on price. Thus, the dual formulation of 
the competition principle reads: 
Competition Principle (Dual Formulation). A move 1t tq q  of the allocation vector is driven 
by competition if the following condition holds: 
 1cov( , ) cov( , ).t tr q r q  (46) 
In other words, a trading institution is competitive if its allocation rule R  is such that 
cov( , ( )) cov( , )t tRr q r q for any admissible allocation .q The trading rule is purely competitive 
(it imposes no friction on competitive discovery) if the maximum covariance is attainable under 
the trading rule.  
The two dual formulations of pure competition agree by Lemma 3: a market reaches a purely 
competitive equilibrium allocation *q if and only if the final standing transaction price *p is in 
the value center, since:   
                                        ( *) max ( ) min ( ) ( *).V p V pq q  
One can show that the covariance condition (46) imposes a constraint on the trade sequence: 
(46) holds notably when higher-value buyers (lower-cost sellers) tend to outbid (undersell) lower-
value buyers (higher-cost sellers) and hence succeed to trade units to the exclusion of these lat-
ter: competitive trading tends to obey a trading priority rule whereby trades occur in sequence 
of increasing costs and decreasing values. This need only be the case probabilistically, however. 
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One can see the general idea behind these implications of the dual formulation of the competi-
tion principle particularly in view of the following identity:  
      
1 1 1 1
1
2 ,
( )( ) ( ) ( )cov( , ) ( ).
m n m n m n m n
u h u h u u u u
u h u u i
r r q q m n r q r q m n r q q   
From this identity it is not hard to see that the covariance is increasing if trade occurs by increas-
ing (decreasing) order of values (costs), for example. 
  
We close this brief discussion on the dual view of competition and institution with a more specific 
theoretical reading of a few bid/ask acceptance or trade priority rules common in DA-run mar-
kets: to avoid any ambiguity, we need to make explicit the following definition, implicit in the 
very notion of competition: we say that bid/ask submissions are competitive if they preserve the 
ranking of the reservation prices. If so, it is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional evo-
lution is directly responsive to the Max-WTP/Min-WTA efficient price discovery process.   
Proposition 3 (Competitive Trade Priority Rules). Consider a trading institution allowing traders 
to compete through bid/ask submissions and whereby trade is to occur by priority of higher 
bids/lower asks, at a standing ask or bid. Then the trading institution is purely competitive (that 
is, it will lead to a final transaction price in the value center) provided the maximum trade volume 
is attainable under it. The same is true more generally of any trading rule ( ),R R m based on 
traders’ messages ( ),m m  which organizes trade among the value and cost distribution r
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[ ]ur  by priority of a (one-dimensional) trade-message identifying parameter [ ]u (bid/ask or 
message submission time) submitted competitively.22   
Proof. Consider the allocation vector 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0[ ,..., , ,..., ; ,..., , ,..., ],q where the nonzero en-
tries amount to the maximum number of mutually tradable units. By the so-called rearrangement 
inequality, the maximum possible surplus u uur q is achieved when the units are allocation (or 
rationed) according to the ranks of the reservation prices, namely when 0( )( ) .u h u hr r q q  
This allocation is a purely competitive one. It is achieved more generally by any allocation rule 
( )u u uq q  such that 0( )( )u h u hq q  and 0( )( ) .u h u hr r By Lemma 3, maximum 
actual surplus allocation corresponds to minimum potential surplus, or the value center. ∎ 
3.4 Large Market Model                     
In the old view of competition, the number of buyers or sellers per se is not a crucial parameter, 
as was clear from the ongoing theory and as will be illustrated more specifically in the next sec-
tion on applications of the theory. For mathematical simplicity, however, and merely for that, it 
is useful at times to assume a textbook-style large market, whose behavior can be assumed 
smooth by the law of large numbers. This section develops this specific large-market model. For-
mally, we study the limit behavior of a market 1{[ ,..., ;nv v 1,..., ]; }mc c H  when .m n To 
this end, the theory is better restated in terms of per-unit average functions, by normalizing all 
 
22 A second example is a trading rule according to which traders compete to submit trade orders the earliest possible 
and trade is to occur by priority of submission time (first-in, first-out rule).  
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relevant functions. (In fact, we could have formulated the theory from the beginning in normal-
ized form, stating everything relatively to the market’s size, m n .) 
Throughout this section, therefore, we think in terms of per-unit average functions, while keep-
















 ( ) ( ) ( ).Z p D p S p  (49) 
The potential surplus (or price-value distance) function per unit can be written as 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),V p D p s p S p s p  (50) 
where, by definition, we write 
  1 1
1




s p v p I v p
D p
 (51) 
  2 1
1




s p p c I c p
S p
 (52) 
The integral formula (1) for the potential surplus yields (by identification) the known formulas:23 
 1
0
1( ) ( ) ,
( )
p
s p S x dx
pS
      (53) 
  2
1( ) ( ) .
( ) p
s p D x dx
pD
              (54) 
 
23 These functions are familiar in probability theory: the first function is sometimes referred to as the “mean excess 




In normalized form, the surplus (namely average surplus per unit) is simply: 
 ( ) cov( , ).q r q  (55) 
As emphasized in Lemma 3 (price-quantity duality), there is an intrinsic connection between sur-
plus maximization and competitive allocation; in fact, we could have chosen to take as an axiom, 
the dual formulation of the competition principle: 1 0cov( , ) cov( , ), .t t tr q r q  Due notably 
to buyer-buyer and seller-seller rivalry (or type 2 competition), the covariance between the allo-
cation vector and the reservation prices is increasing through competition, and one can show 
that units tend to trade by priority of higher values and lower costs. In contrast, absence of type 
2 competition is indicated by the condition: 
 1 2 0cov( , | ) cov( , | ) ,v q v p c q c p  (56) 
where 1q and 2q are the restrictions of the trade indicator q to demand and supply units, respec-
tively. We will also consider explicitly short-side rationing, which means that the total quantity 
traded is the minimum between the quantity demanded and that which is supplied: 
 min( , ).Q S D  (57) 
Intuitively, as we said, a market involving a sufficiently large number of diverse reservation prices 
behave smoothly.24 More formally: 
 
24 Throughout, “smooth” means “differentiable with continuous derivative”. The intuition behind this concept of 
large market goes back to an observation of Cournot (1838 [1897], p. 50) on aggregate demand, which is smooth by 
the law of large numbers. As he turned to the supply side, Cournot would also inspire a second, more influential, 
notion of a large market, a model of “perfect competition”, which mathematical economists would translate ab-
stractly (in the language of measure theory) as a market with “continuum of traders” (Aumann, 1964).   
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Definition 4 (Large Market). We say that a market [ , ]Hr  is large if its average behavior is smooth: 
that is, the functionH is smooth, and the costs and values are distributed according to continuous 
density functions supported respectively on min max[ , ]c c  and min max[ , ].v v
25 






As already emphasized (Section 2), the law of supply and demand reads simply:  
 0[ ( ) ( )] ( ) .
dV
S p D p H p
dt
 (59) 
Pure competition in a large market amounts to assuming the stronger form of the law of supply 
and demand for a large market:26   
 sign( ) sign( ),H D S  (60) 
where the sign function is defined as  











The following proposition is a direct implication of the large-market assumption: 
Proposition 3 (Unique Large-Market Equilibrium). A large market’s value center coincides with 
the market-clearing price, which is unique.  
 
25 We are implicitly assuming bounded supports; otherwise, if maxc  or max ,v  then the left and right 
limits are excluded, and we assume then ( )c  and ( ) .v  
26 That price change and excess demand have the same sign, and the short-side ratioing constraint (57) are significant 
elements in Adam Smith’s verbal description of the dynamics of market price formation. (See Inoua & Smith, 2020c, 
Subsection 2.6.)  
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Proof. A large market’s excess demand Z D S  is a strictly decreasing function: hence there 
is a unique *p argmin ( )V x { :x 0( ) },Z x by the strict convexity of .V ∎     
The following result emphasizes weaker conditions and mechanisms under which competitive 
equilibrium emerges in a large market (illustrated in Figure 7).                                                                                                                                                    
Theorem 2. Consider a large market. The strict law of supply and demand, sign( )H sign(D
),S is sufficient for global convergence to the competitive equilibrium price. Under short-side ra-
tioning, any price adjustment rule that maximizes the number of transactions ( )Q p
min{ ( ), ( )}S p D p also leads to competitive equilibrium; maximum surplus is reached under this 
trading institution even if 1cov( , |v q )v p 2cov( , |c q 0) ,c p in which case the surplus 




Figure 7. A Large market’s competitive dynamics. (a) Supply and demand (exponential 
value and cost distributions [mean(value)=5, mean(cost)=3, H(Z)=10Z] and number of 
transactions under short-side rationing. (b) Price trajectories are shown for various initial 
conditions. (c) Potential versus actual surplus (the latter calculated under the no-covari-
ance assumption.). (d) Dynamics of potential versus actual surplus. 
 
Proof. Since ( )V p ( ) ( ),Z p H p  and sign( ) sign( ),H Z we have E { : ( )x V x 0}  { :x  
( )Z x 0( *) } { *},H p p which is an invariant set, since 0( *) .H p It follows from the invari-
ance principle that ( ) *,p t p for any initial 0 ,p since ( )V x as | | .x Under short-side 
rule, min( , ).Q S D If *,p p 0'( ) '( ) ,Q p S p and if *,p p 0'( ) '( ) ,Q p Q p therefore
( )Q p is maximum at *.p p A large market’s mean surplus is 1( )vq 1( ).cq Since 1q
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0  if ,v p  we have 1( )vq 1( |vq ) ( )v p v p  and 1( )q 1( |q ) ( ).v p v p  By 
1cov( , |v q )v p 0  is meant  
1( | )vq v p 1( | ) ( | ).v v p q v p  
Then 
1( )vq ( | )v v p 1[ ( | ) ( )]q v p v p ( |v v )p ( )Q p 1[ ( ) ] ( ).s p p Q p  
Similarly, 2 2 2 2( ) [ ( )] [ ( )] ( ),cq p s p q p s p Q p and, therefore, 
( )p 1[ ( )s p 2( )] ( ).s p Q p   
Thus 1 2 1 2' '' '( ) ( ),Q s s Q s s for *p p (where the prime denotes differentiation with re-
spect to price). It follows from (53)-(54) that       
                                       1's 1 1( '/ )S S s  and 2's 2( '/ )D D s 1,  
hence,  
' 1 2( '/ ){ }Q Q Q s s 1{ ( ' / )Q S S s 2( '/ ) }.D D s  
Thus, after rearranging terms, we get 
1' {( '/ '/ )Q Q Q S S s ( '/Q Q 2'/ ) }.D D s  
If *,p p min( , ) ,Q S D S and ' ( '/S S S 2 0'/ ) .D D s If *,p p ,Q D  and '





4 Application: Specific Market Institutions as Examples Embedded in the Theory      
This section reviews a few well-known observed market institutions that are contained in the 
theory. The goal is to illustrate the breadth of the old view on competitive market price for-
mation, and to emphasize more specifically how, behind the mechanics of a few well-known mar-
kets, lies at work the PMI. That is, we illustrate the theory as it applies to a few standard cases, 
which, while commonly viewed intuitively as driven by competition, yet are not usually analyzed 
in terms of the basic supply and demand diagram, due to dominant belief in neoclassical require-
ments for competitive equilibrium: large number of traders, price-taking behavior, market clear-
ance, complete information. Paradoxically, increased public information on value, or sophisti-
cated individual rationality more generally, may hinder or limit collective market rationality and 
efficiency, where strategic behavior may be transactions costly. Experiments have been reported 
in which complete public, compared with incomplete, or private, information on values and costs 
slows convergence to the center of attraction. (V. Smith, 1980, p. 357-360) Essentially, more in-
formation is worse because it invites strategies that are not sustainable, which delays reaching 
the Center. We emphasize the generality of the value center C in explaining the competitive out-
come of known market cases, illustrating in the process the calculation of ,C although its graph-
ical determination is easy enough. Needless to say, that this section is not intended to be a sys-
tematic comparative analysis of market institutions and conditions; the goal is simply to bring 
back to the realm of standard competitive price theory a number of market cases and institutions 
that a century-and-half of marginalist tradition in economics has excluded, because the theoret-
ical requirements of neoclassical price theory are often taken to be requirements of the empirical 
price mechanism itself. 
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From these illustrations will emerge the proposition that the relevant taxonomy of markets is not 
one in terms of the number of traders, but one in terms of the forms of competition operating in 
each market, and the constraints imposed by the trading institution (the trading rules organizing 
trade in a market). As long as a market is driven by at least one form of competition, competitive 
equilibrium naturally emerges within the boundaries set by the trading institution. A trading rule 
usually emerges from trial-and-error practice and usually acts as a catalyzer of competition, by 
fostering competitive price discovery (for example, the bid-ask reduction rule); but in the process 
it may also impose constraints on purely competitive dynamics by acting as friction.  
Unless stated otherwise, competitive dynamics is simulated in all illustrations using a log-linear 
approximation of the law of supply and demand:  
 1 exp{ [ ( ) ( )]},t t t tp p D p S p  (61) 
where the positive parameter is chosen to yield 1( ) ( )t tV p V p  approximately. (The discon-
tinuity of supply and demand typically creates oscillations in the dynamics.)27  
4.1 Isolated Exchange: The Smallest Market  
Consider the simplest market, a casual, isolated, bargain between a buyer (with valuation 0v ) 
and a seller (with valuation 0)c on a unit of a good 1( ).m n  (Let 0 0 ,c v for a transaction to 
occur.) This market is a special case of a market configuration studied experimentally by Smith 
 
27 It goes without saying that 1,...,t T denotes real transaction time, unlike in the tatonnement story, which, by 
having imposed that all traders must take price as exogenous parameter beyond their control, is led to ascribe the 
fundamental task of price adjustment to a fictional auctioneer in “virtual time”. That is, the difficulty in the tatonne-
ment story is not the (linear version of) formula (61) per se, which is a reasonable approximation of the law of supply 
and demand, but the derivation of supply and demand from price-taking behavior and the law of one price. 
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and Williams (the so-called box design). Its value center is C 0 0[ , ].c v Hence the bargain would 
be concluded at some price in 0 0[ , ],c v as is known.            
 
Figure 8. Isolated Buyer-Seller Haggling Simulated: (a) Supply and Demand (b) Price 
dynamics: p0>vmax means we are modeling the standing ask price (see footnote 10). 
(c) Potential surplus function V (left scale) and information function I (in bits, right 
scale). (d) Dynamics of V. 
Chamberlin’s (1948) experiments can be viewed as a collection of isolated exchanges, each of 
which is to be treated in all rigor as an isolated market in itself. Thus, by an appropriate defini-
tion of the market size, competitive equilibrium may still apply: each transaction price in these 
distance-separated, or “isolated,” trades, is a competitive equilibrium, and their multiplicity 
simply reflect the multiplicity of relevant markets.28 V. L. Smith’s (1962) experiments are in this 
 
28 John List’s replication of Chamberlin’s (1948) bargaining markets over time demonstrate that “publicity of…bids 
and asks are not necessary for markets to equilibrate… List (2004, p. 1154)    
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sense the first experiments of an organized market, where the oral double-auction trading rule 
allows contiguous buyers and sellers to participate in a distinct, collective higgling and bargain-
ing, which can then be treated as a unique market.                                          
4.2 Swastika and Box Supply-Demand Configurations 
Consider the following market, well-stud 0 0[ , ],c v ied in the lab (V. L. Smith, 1965; V. L. Smith & 
Williams, 1990), involving 0 0 0 0[ ,..., ; ,..., ],v v c cr with 0 0v c so that trade is possible. We have
( )V p 0(n v 0) ( )p I v p 0 0( ) ( ).m p c I c p By Lemma 2, arg min ( ),C V p 0[ ,c
0].v For p in , ( )V p 0( )n v p (m p 0)c 0(nv 0)mc (m ) .n p  So three cases should 
be contrasted. If ,m n V increases (linearly) on , so 0{ }.C c If ,m n V decreases on ,
hence 0{ }.C v (These two cases are known as the ‘swastika design’.) If ,m n V is constant on 
,  hence 0 0[ , ].C c v  This is the  ‘box design’ originally suggest by Edgeworth as an exam-
ple of equilibrium indeterminacy (multiple equilibria).29 The above theory says that if price 
evolves purely competitively, then 0tp c if 1, 0tp v ; if. 1, .and 1, tp 0 0[ , ],c v
that is, tp can be anywhere in for t big enough. This prediction, ,tp C matches the experimental 
findings within a few cents. Of course, the lab DA competition cannot be perfectly pure due to 
transaction costs and other frictions, as emphasized more formally below (Subsection 4.6). First, 
trade of an abstract commodity representation (lab) differs from trade of a commodity bought 
for its use-value (field). For a commodity you think is worth 0v dollars use-value, you would be 
 
29 “Suppose a market, consisting of an equal number of masters and servants, offering respectively wages and ser-
vices; subject to the condition that no man can serve two masters, no master employ more than one man” Edge-
worth, 1881 p. 59) 
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willing to pay up to (and including) that value; and the seller, who values the commodity’s pro-
duction cost to be 0c dollars would be willing to accept that amount, provided that the cost is 
classically defined, namely as reservation prices including a minimum profit requirement. In the 
lab, however, a subject-trader that buys or sells at the limit prices would make no monetary ben-
efit through the trade (since the object of trade is an abstract commodity representation). Thus, 
it was common to pay the lab subject-traders a small commission to induce trade at the limit 
prices, notably near CE. The “swastika” is a good design for measuring this transaction cost, the 
minimum amount required to induce trade at the limit price, since by construction all trades must 
occur at a limit price (V. L. Smith & Williams, 1990).30       
 
30 In the experiments, a buyer (seller) earns zero at price equal to their value (cost). The observations in the swastika 
experiments yield a value minus price distance measure of the minimum profit a buyer requires, and similarly for a 
seller. Uncertainty as to this profit implies that the attractor price can only be specified subject to this same uncer-




Figure 9. Simulation of a non-clearing market studied in the lab (V. L. Smith & 
Williams, 1990, Figure 10, Condition A). (a) “Swastika” supply and demand con-
figuration. (b) Price dynamics. (c) Potential surplus function, V, and value and cost 
information amount, I, revealed by price (in bits). (d) Dynamics of V. 
 
4.3 Auctions: English versus Other Institutions  
The English auction of a single unit (say an artwork) is the most popular auction form: the auc-
tioneer announced an initial minimum acceptable bid, and the bidders sequentially raise each  
standing bid price, until no bidder is willing to raise it further, at which point the standing bidder 
wins the unit by paying the standing bid price. Classically, there is nothing special about the Eng-
lish auction as a competitive market (the absence of competition on the supply side is irrelevant, 
since competition is on the buyers’ side). The English auction is indeed the simplest example of a 
market that is entirely driven by buyer-buyer competition (a single passive seller, with buyers 
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outbidding one another).31 At an elementary practical level, the English auction illustrates the 
defining features of classical price formation theory in which traders bring their WTP (WTA) val-
ues to market; aggregation and price discovery are joint functional consequences of the market 
process. The market end-state is maximum value revelation—the allocation is to the buyer who 
most highly values the item, at a price profitable to the seller.   
Because it is driven by ordinary competition, the English auction is no exception to standard com-
petitive price theory in terms of supply and demand, and its outcome is a regular case of com-
petitive equilibrium, provided only that supply, demand, and C.E. are as define in the foregoing 
theory (namely as value and cost distributions and value center, respectively).  
The dominant approach to auctions today is of course the game-theoretical approach, starting 
from the seminal work of W. S. Vickrey (1961), and expanded into a vast literature (recently 
awarded a new recognition).32 This approach produced many detailed important insights about 
the theory and design of auctions. Rather than reviewing these specific game-theoretic models, 
which is not possible here, we simply want to briefly contrast this usually parametric class of 
models with the qualitative (nonparametric) direct predictions of foregoing classical price theory 
and to establish as a direct consequence of the foregoing theory the superiority, ceteris paribus, 
 
31 The “English auction” has a colorful history. Its origin is not English; rather, it was introduced into England by the 
Roman occupation. Roman auctioneers followed the soldiers who were paid in the spoils-of-war property they seized 
and needed to convert into gold or currency. It was an ascending bid procedure, as suggested by the Latin auctiō, 
from the Latin verb augere, “to increase”. Further emphasizing the connection with warfare, auctions were con-
ducted sub hasta, “under the spear.” Thus, for example, in Spanish, “subhasta” refers to an auction or auction house 
(Cassady, 1967, pp 26-30)  
32 The literature on the game-theoretic approach to auctions is vast: for a review, see, e.g., the background to the 
recent Nobel Prize in Economics (2020), awarded to P. R. Milgrom and R.B. Wilson. It is notable that although auction 
theory was founded on distributions functions of value, meaning Max-WTP, this modelling perspective was not part 
of neoclassical/modern supply and demand theory.  Implicitly, however, it was part of Adam Smith’s verbal model 
of price formation in a market. (See Inoua & Smith, 2020c, Subsection 2.6.) 
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of the simple, ordinary competitive rationality of the English auction in terms of aggerate welfare 
and information efficiency.   
Formally, the English auction of a single item is a market with r 1 0[ ,..., ; ],nv v c where the seller’s 
reserve price is 0 ,c and the buyers’ valuations are as usual arranged in descending order, 1v
2 ...v 1nv .nv The value center is easily determined graphically to be 2 1[ , ],C v v assum-
ing 2 0.v c Formally, the endpoints of the value center are by Lemma 2 respectively the right 
and left endpoints of the following intervals:  
                      2{ : ( ) ( )} ] , ]x D x S x v  and 1{ : ( ) ( )} [ , [.x D x S x v  
Thus, by the competition of the buyers, 2 1[ , ],tp v v since the rivalry will ultimately be between 
the two highest-value buyers, ‘1’ and ‘2’. Clearly 2tp v is a possibility: if perchance ‘1’ bids 2 ,v
then this bid would conclude the auction (‘2’, whose limit price is reached, cannot raise the bid 
anymore). Yet 2v is not a market-clearing price, since 2( )D v 2( )S v 2 1 1.More generally, 
the value center of an English auction is not hard to determine graphically (by considering the 
two cases 0c v and 1v 0c 2).v Formally, it is given by Lemma 2 as:  




Figure 10. English Auction Simulated. (a) Cumulative distribution of values (5 to 40 
by increment of 5) and cost (or seller reserve price, 10). (b) Price dynamics: mini-
mum bid increment min = 5. (c) Potential surplus function, V, and Information, I, 
revealed by price (in bits). (d) Dynamics of the potential surplus, V. 
More explicitly, the standing price in the English is tp 0( ),
tH c since by construction the initial 
price asked is 0 0p c  (the seller’s reservation price). The other institutional constraint is the 
minimum price increment allowed, say min . So the English auction price dynamics can be writ-
ten in all generality as:33   
 0 0 1 min, [ ( ) ( )], .t t t t t tp c p p I D p S p  (63) 
 
33 Reminder: ( )I A denotes the indicator of ,A namely 1( )I A ifA is true, 0( )I A ifA is false. 
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That is, the Auctioneer announces the opening bid at 0 0p c  and the standing bid price in-
creases by increments min{ : }t t so long as there is more than one bidder standing to an-
nounce their bid. In the reasonable case 2 0 ,v c and assuming for simplicity of discussion t
min , we have the dynamics (assumed in the simulations in Figure 10 and Figure 11): 
 0 0 1 1min, [#{ : } ].t t i tp c p p I i v p  (64) 
This simple exercise illustrates more specifically the practical interpretation of the general the-
ory’s vocabulary. The qualitative, nonparametric, prediction ,tp C predicts all possible out-
come for an English auction’s final price: the final transaction price can be anywhere in .C That 
general outcome is brought about by the pure competitive bidding process; the specific outcome 
depends on the institutional parameter min through the constraint min ,t 1,..., .t T   
The English auction has been extended to multiple units (McCabe, Rassenti, & Smith, 1990). The-
oretically, the single item case extends easily to the generalized auction ofm units: the value 
center in the general case is C 0[max( ,c 1), ],m mv v where mv are the thm  and 1( )thm high-




Figure 11. Multiple-Unit English Auction Simulated (Four Units). (a) Values and cost 
(seller reserve price). (b) Price dynamics: minimum bid increment min =5. (c) Po-
tential surplus function, V, and Information, I, revealed by price (in bits). (d) Dy-
namics of the potential surplus, V. 
   
Having emphasized the value center as the English auction’s competitive outcome, the foregoing 
theory provides a qualitative (nonparametric) comparative prediction in terms of comparative 
efficiency of the English auction vis-à-vis any other auction form, notably the Dutch and sealed-
bid auctions.  
Proposition 4 (Superior Efficiency of English Auction). For a given seller’s reserve price and bid-
ders’ reservation value distribution, the English auction is at least as efficient as any other possible 
auction form, both informationally (price discovery or value revelation) and in terms of welfare 
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(surplus). (Also, ceteris paribus, the English auction price or revenue is at least as high as in the 
second-price sealed-bid auction.)  
Proof. For simplicity, assume single-object auctions. Since tp C for the English auction, the 
first part merely specializes Theorem 1. The second part is essentially true by definition of reser-
vation value. The English seller’s revenue is ( )TR p ( Tp 0 0 2) ( ) ( ),Tc I p c R v where Tp is 
the transaction price (or final standing price if no trade happens). Considering a sealed-bid auc-
tion, let 1b 2b ... 1nb nb be the buyers’ bids, to be submitted to the auctioneer. What-
ever the bidding strategy adopted by the bibbers in the sealed-bid second price, the seller’s rev-
enue is 2( )R b 2(b 0 2 0 2) ( ) ( ),c I b c R v since by definition of reservation price 2b 2.v
∎ 
We put the second part of Proposition 4 in parenthesis because it has not the same importance 
as the first part, and not merely mathematically: in traditional economic analysis, white matters 
is efficiency at the aggregate market level, rather than efficiency from the viewpoint of a partic-
ular agent (the seller). Both the welfare and informational optimality of the English auction holds 
even if we include the commission the seller pays to the auctioneer (after the sale).  
The Dutch and sealed-bid auction processes reveal no public information as in the English auction 
and this introduces strategic considerations into rational action. 34 Yet sophisticated strategic 
(game-theoretical) rationality cannot outperform ordinary higgling and bargaining rationality in 
terms of price discovery and social welfare generated. The knowledge requirement in game 
 
34 For a comparative study of multiple-unit Dutch versus English auctions see McCabe et al. (1990). 
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theory, be it reminded, is usually strong (in fact infinite) knowledge requirement on the part of 
each bidder (the common knowledge assumption). A strategically rational bid requires a sense 
of how others will bid and a solution, as in game theory, postulates bidder knowledge of the 
distribution of values among the participants—an imperfect alternative but kindred to Jevons’ 
perfect information hypothesis. Moreover, this knowledge must be common to all if a symmetric 
equilibrium is to exist. In the English auction, such prior knowledge is of worthless value, as others 
will publicly reveal that information during the auction. Concerning these different auction pro-
tocols, classical theory makes a qualitative, comparative, prediction, easily tested in the lab: for 
the same value distribution (and controlling for transaction costs), the more sophisticated forms 
of auction will not outperform the English (in terms of value-revelation and surplus extraction). 
More knowledge and more sophisticated rationality do not necessarily improve market perfor-
mance. 
English auctions, traditionally requiring bidders to be present, are thereby transactions costly, 
and were most suited to unique art items of high value. Sealed bid auctions therefore are more 
suitable for items of relatively low value. Since the highest bid wins in the English auction, it might 
have appeared natural, if incorrect, for practitioners seeking to broaden the use of auctions to 
apply the first price rule when the bids are submitted sealed and hidden from other bidders.   
The second-price rule emerged naturally in free-entry markets long before auction theorists 
proved its equivalence to the English auction. It was used by stamp collectors in the 19th century. 
(Lucking-Reiley, 2000) The rule is also used in the London Stamp auction (and for art objects sold 
at English auction) where off-floor book bids can be submitted. Auctioneers apply the second 
price rule as a principle in this mixed-bid environment: If the floor bids stop at a price below the 
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highest book bid, but above the second highest book bid, the award goes to the high book bid at 
the highest oral outcry price; if the floor bidding stops at a price below the second highest book 
bid, the auctioneer offers to sell it at that price, and if no one bids higher, the  highest book bidder 
wins at a price equal to the second highest book bid.  
4.4 Sealed-bid Auctions or Call Markets 
Financial markets traditionally closed in late afternoon and reopened the next morning. In double 
auction trading they close at a final bid-ask spread, but the relevance of that spread is often in-
validated by the overnight accumulation of information. This led to the demand for a means of 
aggregating that information before the restart of continuous double auction trading the next 
day. One solution was a “call” market procedure, adopted at the opening of some financial mar-
kets, which consisted of calling for buy and sell orders at sealed bid or ask prices, with an auc-
tioneer fixing a transaction price that clears the market, or more generally maximizes trade (the 
number of transactions).35  
Informationally, a call market (CM) session from 1t  to t T is formally a set of bid and ask 
messages (price-quantity) 1{( , ) : ,..., }j jb n i n and 1{( , ) : ,..., }j ja m j m  collected during the 
period 1t  to t T  by the auctioneer (market maker), who determines a price p  that clears 
this  market; or, if no clearing price exists, a price that maximize the trade volume; or, if many 
such prices exist, at the mid-price of the trade-maximizing price range.36 In practice, many specific 
 
35 This aggregation procedure also is invoked anytime there is a major news event affecting a stock that triggers a 
halt in trading. A call reopens trading.   
36 Notice that here we have not followed the notational convention of treating individually each value and cost unit; 
but rather we wrote the multiplicities or frequencies explicitly: this is merely to come close to ordinary practice here, 
for we will not carry for long the heavier notation including the frequencies.  
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rules are designed to account for all these possible cases. In the language of the foregoing theory, 
we can summarize these rules in one line: the transaction price is the middle of the value center 
corresponding to the revealed supply and demand (the distribution of the submitted bids and 
asks). Formally, one can show that call-market-price setting rules comes down to applying the  





p  (65) 
where, as in Lemma 2, 
 sup{ : ( ) ( )},r p d p s p  (66) 
 inf{ : ( ) ( )},r p d p s p  (67) 
 
1
( ) ( ),
n
i ii
d p n I b p  (68) 
 
1
( ) ( ).
m
j jj
s p m I a p  (69) 
A call market is therefore a static proxy price fixing rule applied to a price emerging naturally 
from competition for a competitive market, notably a double-auction market (Subsection 4.6) 
where the main obvious difference is: the call-auction price reveals maximally the bid-ask sub-
mitted messages, but need not reveal maximally information about the true, underlying reserva-
tion values (because the traders need not reveal their true underlying valuations, and full willing-
ness to trade, through a one-shot submission of bids and asks). The interesting question, there-
fore, is the extent to which, or the conditions under which, a call-market price approximates the 
underlying value center; or, better, the extent to which the true underlying value center can be 
inferred from the submitted bids and asks. Here is a sketch of how this could be answered.  
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By definition of reservation price, i iv b and j jc a for all , .i j Let D  and S  be the true (under-
lying) willingness to buy and sell (based on values and costs), which are only partly revealed by d  
and s (based on bids and asks). Let i i iv b  and ,j j ja c [ ]i  and [ ].j  It is not 
hard to derive the following (using an expectation notation to denote averaging with respect to 
the subscripted variate):37 
 ( ) [ ( )],D p d p  (70) 
  ( ) [ ( )].S p s p  (71) 
That is, the true underlying demand and supply curves can be in principle estimated from the 
submitted bids and asks (the buying and selling orders submitted to the auctioneer): the revealed 
demand supply curves tend to be shifted versions of the underlying true counterparts. Thus, if 
one could have an idea (through surveys or other empirical work) about the statistics of value-
bid and cost-ask discrepancies in a given market, then one could guess the extent to which the 
revealed call-market price tends to differ from the true value center. For example, assume just 
for simplicity a sufficiently large market to have smooth demand and supply curves and a unique 
equilibrium price. (Proposition 3) Then the following first-order approximation is immediate:  
 ( ) ( ) '( ) ( ).D p d p d p  (72) 
 ( ) ( ) '( ) ( ).S p s p s p  (73) 
 




Let *p be the true (unobserved) clearing price, meaning ( *) ( *),D p S p which at a first-order ap-
proximation is given by (72) and (73) by the equation: 
 0( *) ( *) '( *) ( ) '( *) ( ) .s p d p s p d p  (74) 
Thus from mere knowledge of the average discrepancy between bids (asks) and the underlying 
reservation values (costs) in a market, one can infer approximately the true (unobserved) market-
clearing price from the bids and asks submitted using (74).   
4.5 Posted-Price Market  
Consider the familiar posted-price institution as it appears in retail markets (in which the market 
clearing has a concrete meaning). This is the institution we are most familiar with as buyers and 
is most supportive of the concept of utility maximization subject to the constraint of given prices.  
The posted-price institution, as it has been implanted in experiments, differs from the double-
auction one (Subsection 4.6 below) by its less intense competition since it involves no buyer-
buyer outbidding, and involves at most the two other forms (seller-seller undercutting and buyer-
seller confrontation), and even buyer-seller confrontation is not a direct face-to-face haggling: a 
seller posts a price for a whole period, then buyers refrain from buying if the price is too high, 
leading the seller to cut the next period’s price.38 This less intense competition, combined with 
the fact that price is revised only with delay makes for a slower convergence to competitive 
 
38 In the US economy, with so-called “big ticket” goods like automobiles, appliances, and antiques, the posted price 
is considered an opening offer to be negotiated downward depending on dealer inventories and the buyer’s cash 
available. Prices were routinely negotiated in the general merchandise store, which was replaced by the mass retail-
ing innovations by R. H Macy, F. W. Woolworth, and Sears Roebuck, beginning in the 1870s. These innovations sep-
arated ownership and operation and introduced more centralized pricing in retail stores.  (Ketcham, Smith, & Wil-
liams, 1984)   
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equilibrium compared to the more intense competition of the continuous double auction.39 
(Ketcham et al., 1984) V. L. Smith reports several experiments in which sellers (buyers) are free 
to actively change posted prices in real time, which they do not hesitate to do. (V. Smith, 1964)  
Still, the number of sellers per se is not an intrinsically important parameter for convergence to 
equilibrium: as long as there is type 1 (buyer-seller competition), standard convergence to com-
petitive equilibrium emerges even with one seller. (Classically, one seller in a market is not suffi-
cient to define monopoly.40) This is intuitively clear; yet given neoclassical received doctrine (the 
requirement of “large number of sellers”), it might be useful to emphasize it more explicitly.  
Formally, consider a seller who can producem units of a commodity at the cost of 1[ ,c  ..., ].mc
Assume the seller posts a price tp  for period (day or week) .t  The seller can consider revising it 
in period 1,t for example upward when buyers’ show strong fondness for the article 
[ ( ) ( )],t tD p S p or downward, to get rid of an excess supply. Classically this is a normal compet-
itive price adjustment (that is qualitatively the same as any other competition involving more 
sellers): the competition in this posted-price case, to insist, is a confrontation between the lone 
seller and the buyers (who will refrain from buying if the price is too high, or if they can get a 
price concession). In appearance the seller is merely revising the price to clear the market 
 
39 These early experimental posted offer markets implement price with less flexibility than commonly associated 
with inventory management in large retail establishments. Thus, when slow moving items allow the inventory of 
perishables like milk to rise, the items are offered at a temporary discount from the accustomed posted price. Simi-
larly, the rapid inventory stock-out of an item may lead to its being replenished at higher posted label prices. Classical 
higgling is thereby expressed in the form of rules for real time price adjustment.   




through the rule 0( ) ,t tZ p p but more fundamentally, the competitive price revision process 
is a collectively value and cost revelation from the viewpoint of the foregoing theory, in the sense 
that 1( ) ( ),t tI p I p  at least approximately (for the reason emphasized in Proposition 1: the re-
sulting law of supply and demand is only directional). If moreover, the seller revises the price 
based on accumulated inventories up to the revision date, then the value and cost revelation is 
more exact, in the sense that the price revision rule approximates better 1( ) ( ).t tV p V p The 
crucial point to keep in mind is that for the competition principle to hold, it is irrelevant that there 
is no competition on the supply side: all that matters for the competition principle to hold is there 
is some buyer-seller confrontation, as is clear, again, from a multinomial expansion of  
                                    
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) .| | | |
km nk
j j i ij i
V p c p a p v p a p  
Classically, a lone seller is not treated as a monopolist unless the seller blocks free entry in the 
market and manages to sell the items in a noncompetitive way (which used to be possible with 
state privileges).41  
More generally, a multiple-seller-posted-price market session from 0t  to ,t T is informa-
tionally a series of price offer message 0{ : ,..., }stp t T by each seller, ,s followed by a sequence 
of quantity message 0{ : ,..., }bD t T  by each buyer, ,b  specifying quantity demanded at a 
seller’s posted price. The competition and information principle applies with additional vivacity 
due to seller-seller underselling. 
 
41 On the subtle old view of monopoly, see, e.g., Inoua and Smith (2020a). 
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4.6 Double Auction  
The double auction (DA) is perhaps the best institution in terms of intensity and frequency of 
competitive interactions, since all three forms of competition are in operation (buyer-buyer, 
seller-seller, and buyer-seller); moreover, the DA institution is also the richest institution infor-
mationally (by the higher frequency of quote and trade messages accumulated). Here we present 
synthetically how the forgoing theory specializes for DA competition. 42  
Informationally speaking, a DA market session from 0t  to t T  is a series of bid, ask, and 
trade messages {( ( ),a t ( ),b t accept( ) :t 0 },t T  where each trade message is of the form 
{accept ( )}a t  or {accept ( )}.b t  Thus the state of a DA market requires two state variables, the 
standing ask and standing bid, ( )a t and ( ).b t Merely for simplicity of exposition, we will assume a 
smooth DA market, in particular a continuous-time dynamics, which seems reasonable for a DA.  
DA competition is naturally summarized by the price-value distance (or potential surplus) func-
tion, which, for the DA, takes the form (valid up to normalization for continuous distributions): 
 ( , ) .
c a v b
V a b c a v b  (75) 
That is, more simply: 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ).
c a v b
V a b a c v b  (76) 
Clearly, this function decreases through both seller-seller underselling (whereby the standing ask 
decreases) and through buyer-buyer outbidding (whereby the standing bid rises); but it also 
 
42 Earlier models of the specific DA institution have been offered in the experimental literature (Anufriev, Arifovic, 
Ledyard, & Panchenko, 2013; Asparouhova, Bossaerts, & Ledyard, 2020; Cason & Friedman, 1996; Friedman, 1991; 
Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998; Gode & Sunder, 1993). For a review, see Friedman and Rust (1993 [2018]). A few DA 
models of order-book-driven financial price dynamics are also offered in the quantitative finance literature (e.g., 
Luckock, 2003; E. Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, & Krishnamurthy, 2003). 
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decreases through buyer-seller haggling in a less obvious way: that all forms of competition de-
creases ( , )V a b  follows more formally through the multinomial formula (in essentially the same 
way emphasized in the Motivations: Section 2).  
Alternatively, we can derive this characterization of DA competition from the law of supply and 
demand and the bid-ask reduction process, both implied by the three competition forms: 
 0[ ( ) ( )] ,
db
D b S a
dt
 (77) 
 0[ ( ) ( )] ,
da
D b S a
dt
 (78) 





It is easily shown (as in Lemma 1) that DA price-value distance function can be written as: 
 
0
( , ) ( ) ( ) .
a
b
V a b S x dx D x dx  (80) 
By the chain rule, 
                            ( , ) ( ) ( ) .
d V da V db da db
V a b S a D b
dt a dt b dt dt dt
  
Writing ( )a b a b  for the first term of the second equality, we get after basic manipulation: 
 ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) [ ].
d db d
V a b S a D b S a a b
dt dt dt
 (81) 
Writing ( )b a a b  for the last term, we get similarly:  
 ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) [ ].
d da d
V a b S a D b D b a b
dt dt dt
 (82) 
Or, adding the two equations, we get: 
 
2 2
( ) ( )
( , ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ].
d d a b S a D b d





DA competition then reads simply, in terms of either one of the three formulas (81)-(83): 





Equivalently, DA competition can be characterized in terms of the information function. A bid 
message b  reveals existence of a value ,v b  and an ask message reveals a cost .c a  Thus, 
the information content that the standing bid and standing ask messages reveal about the value 




( ) ( )
( , ) log log .
a v
c b
S x D x
I a b dx dx
m n m n
 (85) 
As bids and asks are sent and revised competitively (hence the quote revisions obey the law of 
supply and demand and bid-ask reduction), it follows from a similar manipulation that yielded 
(81)-(83), that the information these messages reveal about the underlying value and cost distri-
bution increases: 





So far, we are merely specializing the competition principle for the DA. Now we complement the 
discussion by further relating the vocabulary and implication of the foregoing theory to the DA. 
Since the bid and ask are clearly related (because they tend to come closer and closer), DA dy-
namics is perhaps better characterized in terms of, say, the standing ask ,a and the bid-ask 
spread s ,a b so that state of the DA is captured by the couple ( , ),a s  whose dynamics we can 
write as:  












We assume 0 0( , ) ,G a namely 0s is an equilibrium bid-ask spread state.  
The dynamics of the price-value distance function, as given by (82), reads: 
 ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( , ) ( ) ( , ).
d
V a s S a D a s F a s D a s G a s
dt
 (89) 
Notice that the zero-spread market-clearing states 0{( *, ) : ( *) ( *)}E a S a D a  are competitive-
equilibrium (C.E.) states of the DA (where C.E., recall, means more generally stationary potential 
surplus or, equivalently, stationary information revealed). Any such state is by definition a purely 
competitive equilibrium state since it achieved the lowest possible potential surplus. Lab market 
dynamics, as we documented throughout, are well-approximated as convergence throughout 
many repetitions toward a purely competitive equilibrium state, because the frictions in the lab 
DA market are small or inexistent, measured by the many contracts within pennies of the WTP 
value, WTA cost. The lab DA market therefore is the closest realization we know of a purely com-
petitive trade institution. In all generality, however, we should allow for frictions reflected in 
constraining ( , ),F G we should theoretically allow for other equilibrium states, which in the lan-
guage of the forgoing theory we would call constrained competitive DA equilibria or a competi-
tive equilibrium under trade friction: a positive equilibrium spread, 0* ,s being a notable exam-
ple of a friction, namely a transaction cost. Transaction costs and other potential frictions in field 
DA markets are more diverse: not only the bid-ask spread paid to the market maker (as profit) in 
specialist markets, but also: commissions paid to brokers; the trading fees; minimum price tick 




What is the most fundamental law of value theory? The law of supply and demand does not 
qualify, since it derives from the competition principle, postulated as the main axiom of price 
theory in this paper, and which was well-recognized early in classical economics as the core law 
of the discipline: “only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension 
to the character of a science” (J.S. Mill, 1848 [1965], vol. II, bk II, ch. IV, § 1, p. 239). But compe-
tition is not the sole regulator of price (as J.S. Mill goes on to emphasize, insisting on custom as 
the other price regulator). Section 3 above developed a theory of classical competitive price for-
mation, in which the main result (Theorem 1) applies to the model of purely competitive dynam-
ics. Convergence to the value center is a theoretical norm, not necessarily the case in all gener-
ality: in practice this means no limitation on price dynamics imposed by trading institution and 
other, external, institutional regulators of price, except traders’ competition. Throughout the 
derivations in the pure-competition model, we assumed away all frictions. In practice, price dy-
namics depends more generally on a mix of: (1) competition in the market; (2) trading institution; 
and (3) exogenous constraints on price (such as State regulations). Thus, empirically, market equi-
librium should reflect this mix of competition, institution, and regulation. It is in this sense that 
the information principle is the more general and more fundamental principle than the competi-
tion principle (and the law of supply and demand). In all generality, the PMI should be phrased 
as follows: equilibrium price reflects all the relevant data (or information) involved in its for-
mation: the traders’ valuations, the trading institution, and the exogenous constrained regulating 
trade in the market. (By the price-quantity duality, the trading institution and other legal 
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constraint have dual implication on the allocation vector, which depends on whom is allowed to 
compete or trade with whom, and so on.)  
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Mathematical Appendix: The Invariance Principle43 
Definitions (Lyapunov function, invariant set, convergence to a set, radially unbounded function). 
Let 1 0( ), ,t tp H p t  be a “dynamical system”, where the map : .K KH A contin-
uous scalar functionV such that ( ( ))V H x ( )V x for all 0x , is called a Lyapunov func-
tion of the system on 0 .[It is nonincreasing along any trajectory in 0 : 1( ) ( ).t tV p V p ] A 
functionV is radially unbounded if ( )V x as || || .x  A set I is invariant with respect to 
the map H  if ( ) .H I I  (That is, if x A  then ( ) .H x A  Hence if the system ever reaches 
the set ,I  then it stays there forever: if 0p I  then 0( )
tH p I  for all 0.)t  Let E { :x
( ( ))V H x ( )},V x  the set over whichV is stationary; and letA be the largest invariant set con-
tained in the set E  (that is, the union of all invariant subsets of ).E  The distance between a point 
p  and a setA  is defined as dist( , )p A inf || ||,a A p a  using, say, the Euclidian norm. We 
say that tp  converges to the set ,A  and write tp A  as ,t  if 0dist( , )tp A  as .tp A   
Theorem (Invariance Principle). Let 1 ( ),t tp H p  where : K KH is a continuous func-
tion. If the system has a radially unbounded Lyapunov functionV on 0 ,  then tp M  for 
any 0 0 ,p  where M  is the largest invariant set in E 0{ :x ( ( ))V H x ( )}.V x    
 
43 La Salle (1976) is a standard exposition of the invariance theory and the proofs (discrete and continuous times). 
The theorem is covered in stability theory textbooks: for a succinct treatment see Sedaghat (2003, ch. 3); for a more 
comprehensive treatment (discrete and continuous times) see Haddad and Chellaboina (2008); see also (continuous 




Variants of the invariance principle. The radial unboundedness of the Lyapunov functionV guar-
antees that any trajectory 0( )
t
tp H p  is bounded. Without the radial unboundedness property, 
the invariance theorem holds with the following proviso: (1) assuming bounded trajectory; (2) 
the attractor is A 0{ : ( ) },M x V x  where 0lim ( ( ))
t
t
V H p  0
0
min{ ( ( ))}t
t
V H p  
andM is as defined in the theorem. 
The continuous-time version / ( )dp dt H p  is similarly stated, in terms of ( )V p ( )/dV p dt
0grad( ( )) ( ) ,V p H p E 0{ :x 0( ) },V x  and  a set I  is invariant if: 0p A  implies ( )p t
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